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Federal New Releases

New Releases
from Federal Courts

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Criminal law -- Habeas corpus -- Counsel -- Ineffectiveness -- Defendant is not entitled to habeas relief on claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under Confrontation Clause of Sixth Amendment because trial counsel failed to proffer evidence that one of his alleged victims had falsely accused him of kidnapping, even though attorney's performance was deficient, because defendant did not overcome the Section 2254(d)(1) deference owed to state habeas court's holding that defendant failed to surmount the prejudice prong of Strickland -- Scope of review -- Because defendant did not satisfy his burden under Section 2254(d)(1) on record before state habeas court, his motions to supplement the record on appeal with five affidavits pertaining to false kidnapping accusation, or alternatively, for a limited remand for evidentiary hearing in federal court on whether he diligently sought to perfect state habeas record must be denied -- Witnesses -- Confrontation -- Claims that trial court's exclusion of false kidnapping accusation and court's ruling prohibiting cross-examination with respect thereto violated defendant's rights under Confrontation Clause, and that his attorney was ineffective in failing to raise the issue on direct appeals, are procedurally barred because defendant did not fairly present these claims to state habeas court, and defendant has not attempted to show cause and prejudice to excuse this procedural bar

Insurance -- Homeowners -- Building ordinance and law -- Homeowners, who freely contracted to purchase building ordinance and law insurance covering 50% of their home's value and now claim they received no value from their BOL insurance because their home never suffered a covered loss, are not entitled to recover a portion of their premium payments based on assertion that they never gave written consent to 50% BOL coverage on a form approved by Florida Office of Insurance Regulation -- No legal basis exists for reducing insureds' premium payments -- Plain language of Section 627.7011(2), Florida Statutes, does not require an insurer to obtain a policyholder's written consent on a form approved by Florida Office of Insurance Regulation before issuing BOL coverage greater than 25% -- Further, Section 627.418(1) bars insureds' suit because the only remedy available when a policy's limits exceed Florida insurance coverage is to enforce the contract as written

Trademarks -- Cybersquatting -- False designation of origin -- Unfair competition -- Plaintiff who had jointly practiced medicine with defendant doctor until they split their practices filed complaint against defendant, his incorporated practice, and another corporation owned by defendant doctor for cybersquatting, false designation of origin, and unfair competition when defendant incorporated name of their practices without plaintiff's knowledge and registered six domain names with variations of plaintiff's name -- District court clearly erred when it found that plaintiff's name had acquired “secondary meaning,” because plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence that his name had acquired secondary meaning in minds of consumers -- Although plaintiff produced some evidence relevant to Conagra factors for determining if circumstantial evidence establishes that a mark has acquired secondary meaning, he failed to produce any substantial evidence relevant to “the degree of actual recognition by public,” which bears directly on what his name “denotes to the consumer”

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