ALACHUA COUNTY v. DARNELL, __ So.3d __, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2372a (Fla. 1DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-2016 (Alachua County v. Darnell). Order dated May 19, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Counties--Sheriffs--After sheriff's budget has been approved and funds appropriated to sheriff, sheriff has unilateral authority to transfer funds between objects without approval from Board of County Commissioners.
ALAHAD v. STATE, 326 So.3d 1142, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D1962a (Fla. 4DCA 2021). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-1450 (Alahad v. State). Order dated February 11, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Evidence--Identification--Show-up--Suggestiveness--Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to suppress an eyewitness identification of defendant--Fact that defendant was in handcuffs and flanked by two officers during show-up, standing alone, did not render show-up impermissibly suggestive--Court declines to hold that officers' telling witness that defendant "matched the description" was an unnecessarily suggestive procedure used to obtain the identification and that no reasonable judge would rule otherwise--Trial court reasonably concluded that law enforcement's choice to present only defendant, who was identified by name by another witness, and not someone who resembled defendant was not police misconduct that aggravated the show-up's suggestiveness.
ALLEN v. STATE, 298 So.3d 704, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1554a (Fla. 1DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1053 (Allen v. State). Order dated August 11, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Sexual battery on child under age 12--Jury instructions--Lesser-included offenses--Question certified: Is the schedule of lesser included offenses promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court in 2018 in error in classifying sexual battery (§ 794.011(5)) as a necessarily lesser included offense of capital sexual battery (§ 794.011(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018))?
AMERICAN CAPITAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION v. LEEWARD BAY AT TARPON BAY CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., __ So.3d __, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2463a (Fla. 2DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1766 (American Capital Assurance Corporation v. Leeward Bay at Tarpon Bay Condominium Association, Inc.). Order dated February 8, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Insurance--Appraisal--Dispute over coverage and amount of loss--Action involving insurer that initially ceded coverage before subsequently arguing that policy was void due to insured's allegedly fraudulent estimate--Trial court acted within its discretion by compelling appraisal where it is clear that coverage dispute is intertwined with the amount of loss and appraisal would likely assist the trial court when it later determines whether insured fraudulently inflated its claim--Court adopts dual-track approach to determining the order in which the trial courts should resolve damages and coverage issues--Trial court has discretion to determine the order in which the issues of damages and coverage are to be determined, and may compel appraisal on dual-track basis while preserving all of the insurer's rights to contest coverage as a matter of law--Conflict certified.
ANCLA INTERNATIONAL, S.A. v. TRIBECA ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., __ So.3d __, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2189a (Fla. 3DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-24 (Tribeca Asset Management, Inc. v. Ancla International, S.A.). Order dated April 5, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Contracts--Arbitration--Jurisdiction--Arbitration clause in confidentiality agreement between Colombian company and Panamanian company, which stated that the agreement "will be governed by the laws of the State of Florida of the United States of America (USA), a jurisdiction accepted by the parties" conferred jurisdiction on Florida courts to enforce the agreement--Trial court erred in interpreting provision as merely a choice of law provision and in denying petition to compel arbitration.
ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY v. KUBICKI DRAPER, LLP, 266 So.3d 1210, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D269a & D766a. (Fla. 4DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-673 (Arch Insurance Company v. Kubicki Draper, LLP). Order dated June 6, 2019. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Torts--Legal malpractice--Standing--Insurance carrier--Question certified: Whether an insurer has standing to maintain a malpractice action against counsel hired to represent the insured where the insurer has a duty to defend.
BAPTISTE v. STATE, __ So.3d __, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1536a (Fla. 3DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1083 (Baptiste v. State). Order dated October 13, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Jury instruction--Deadlocked jury--Jury instructed to go back and fill out new verdict form if possible after one juror denied agreeing with verdict that was reached after jury had already been given an Allen charge--Trial court erred in giving jury a modified Allen charge after prior instruction and jury's third showing of deadlock--Under totality of circumstances analysis, two or more consecutive Allen charges provide sufficient indicia of coercion, particularly where jury has repeatedly indicated its division with a sole holdout--Defendant waived error in court's instruction because defendant failed to move for mistrial after non-unanimous jury poll or object to modified Allen charge--Even if error were considered fundamental, defendant waived it by agreeing to modified charge.
BIRCH v. STATE, 248 So.3d 1213, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1191a (Fla. 1DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-1330 (Birch v. State). Order dated June 5, 2019. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Possession of firearm by convicted felon--Information--Defects--Charging language for possession of firearm was not defective or fundamentally erroneous, and did not preclude a conviction for either actual or constructive possession--Any defect in information did not rise to level of a deprivation of due process--Jury's special interrogatory verdict finding no actual possession under 10-20-Life is not properly extended to preclude guilt of underlying offense by constructive possession--A special interrogatory verdict such as for 10-20-Life is analytically separate from verdicts for underlying crimes, and neither eliminates nor supplies an element of underlying crimes--Evidence of possession was legally sufficient to allow jury to convict defendant of either actual or constructive possession of firearm.
BOOKER v. STATE, 244 So.3d 1151, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D795a (Fla. 1DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-752 (Booker v. State). GAYMON v. STATE, 268 So.3d 222, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D957c (Fla. 1DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-712 (Gaymon v. State). Order dated September 19, 2019 (Consolidated). No oral argument for Gaymon v. State. Criminal law--Sentencing--Guidelines--Upward departure--Danger to public--Enhancement of sentences under section 775.082(10) was unconstitutional where trial judges found that defendants posed a danger to the public based on more than prior convictions, and on facts which were not found by a jury or admitted by defendants--Errors were not harmless--Proper remedy is to invalidate defendants' sentences and remand for resentencing under prior version of statute.
BOSTON v. STATE, 296 So.3d 580, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1297a (Fla. 1DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1164 (Boston v. State). Order dated October 7, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Immunity--Stand Your Ground law--Burden of proof--A criminal defendant convicted by jury verdict after rasing a self-defense claim is not entitled to a new immunity hearing, even where trial court applies incorrect standard under statute--Because the state overcame defendant's self-defense claim by meeting the heavier trial burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court's failure to require state to overcome defendant's immunity claim with clear and convincing evidence at immunity hearing was cured--Conflict certified.
BOYLE v. SAMOTIN, __ So.3d __, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1577e (Fla. 2DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1399 (Boyle v. Samotin). Order dated December 8, 2020. No oral argument. Torts--Medical malpractice--Limitation of actions--Tolling--Presuit requirements--Notice of intent--Service--No error in determining that complaint in medical negligence action was barred by the four-year statute of repose contained in section 95.11(4)(b) where, although plaintiff placed presuit notice of intent in the mail and properly served it in the manner prescribed under section 766.106(4) within applicable limitations period, defendant did not sign the return receipt for the notice of intent until after the limitations period expire--It is the date that notice is received rather than the date the notice is mailed that is relevant for the purposes of determining whether the statute of limitations has been tolled--Conflict certified.
BROWN v. CITY OF GULF BREEZE, 336 So.3d 1226, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D560a & D1010a (Fla. 1DCA 2022). Supreme Court Case No. SC22-741 (City of Gulf Breeze v. Brown). Order dated August 18, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Taxation--Ad valorem--Exemptions--Municipal property--Golf course--Private management--Question certified: Is a city's public golf course still being "used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes," so that it remains tax exempt under Article VII, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, if the city turns the course and its appurtenant facilities over to a private business to operate and manage for the business's own profit or loss, in return for an annual fee that the business pays to the city for the privilege?
BUECHEL v. SHIM, __ So.3d __, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D265b (Fla. 5DCA 2021). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-249 (Shim v. Buechel). Order dated May 27, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Creditors' rights--Jurisdiction--Trial court erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction to order judgment debtor to deliver a negotiable instrument located in Korea to satisfy a judgment--Trial court may order a debtor over whom court has in personam jurisdiction to act on assets located outside court's territorial jurisdiction, provided the court does not directly affect the title to the property while it remains in the foreign jurisdiction--Conflict certified.
BURNS v. STATE, __ So.3d __, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1569c (Fla. 1DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-1208 (State v. Burns). Order dated January 2, 2019. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Sentencing--Factors--Lack of remorse and assertion of innocence--Trial court improperly relied on lack of remorse and assertion of innocence when sentencing defendant, who initially confessed to crime and thereafter entered plea of not guilty, demanded jury trial, attempted to retract confession during trial testimony, and maintained innocence at sentencing--Question certified: May a sentencing court rely on a defendant's lack of remorse after the defendant has given a post-Miranda sworn confession to the crime and has obviously lied under oath at trial about his guilt?
CITY OF BARTOW v. FLORES, 301 So.3d 1091, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1298a (Fla. 1DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1126 (City of Bartow v. Flores). Order dated April 23, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Workers' compensation--Medical benefits--One-time change in physician--Upon written request to employer/carrier, statute entitles injured worker to a one-time change of physician--The E/C controls selection if the alternate physician is authorized within five days of receipt of the request--However, E/C forfeits right of selection if it subsequently fails to provide the alternate physician by unreasonable delay in acquisition of an appointment date--Competent substantial evidence supported judge of compensation claims' determination that as a result of its unreasonable delay in providing claimant with an appointment date, the E/C failed to provide an alternate physician to claimant--JCC did not err in awarding authorization of a claimant-selected alternate physician--Question certified whether an E/C's duty to timely furnish medical treatment under section 440.13(2), which includes a claimant's right to a one-time change of physician during the course of such treatment pursuant to subsection (2)(f), is fulfilled solely by timely authorizing an alternate physician to treat the claimant or whether, in order to retain its right of selection after timely authorizing the alternate physician to treat the claimant, the E/C must actually provide the claimant an appointment date with the authorized alternate physician?
COUNTY OF VOLUSIA v. DESANTIS, 302 So.3d 1001, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1956a (Fla. 1DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1356 (Lee v. County of Volusia). Order dated April 23, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. August 17, 2020. Counties--Constitutional officers--Declaratory action filed by county seeking declaration that 2018 amendment to article VIII section 1, which eliminated previously authorized home-rule power over selection of county constitutional officers, did not affect county's pre-existing methods of selection, performance, and management of its constitutional officers--Trial court did not err in ruling that county was required to comply with the amendment--Court rejects argument that county is not subject to new constitutional amendment because its charter amendments were "grandfathered in" and retroactive application would be impermissible--Amendment is not retroactive where the amendment only required the county to alter its future structure for county constitutional officers and attached no new legal consequences to county's charter amendments or its past actions or operations--Secretary of State was proper party to county's lawsuit because secretary is the official charged with enforcing the legal provision at issue in the litigation--Intervenors were admitted into the litigation in subordination to the named parties where orders granting intervention did not expressly order that intervention was not subordinate--The governor was not a proper party to the lawsuit where governor has no direct cognizable interest in the litigation--Governor's position as chief executive officer is too broad to support defendant status merely because a state law is at issue--Additionally, the governor's duty to sign commissions falls short of any duty to enforce the amendment at issue.
COZEN O'CONNOR, PLC v. MINTZ TRUPPMAN, P.A., 306 So.3d 259, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1463b (Fla. 3DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1225 (Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen O'Connor, PLC.). Order dated April 26, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Jurisdiction--Prohibition--Circuit court had no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate claim for violation of Mediation Confidentiality and Privilege Act, seeking additional attorney's fees for plaintiff's representation of client in federal court, where federal court had rendered final judgment on fee claim--Collateral estoppel bars re-litigation in state court of claims that were adjudicated in federal court--Petition for prohibition granted--Trial court directed to dismiss complaint.
CRELLER v. STATE, 336 So.3d 817, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D795a (Fla. 2DCA 2022). Supreme Court Case No. SC22-524 (State v. Creller). Order dated August 3, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Search and seizure--Traffic stop--Dog sniff--Failure to exit vehicle--Defendant, who was stopped for a traffic infraction, arrested for his failure to exit vehicle to allow officers to conduct a vehicle sweep with K-9--Discussion of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, Maryland v. Wilson, and Rodriguez v. United States--Trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to suppress contraband discovered as a result of seizure where record affirmatively established that defendant's removal from the vehicle was not necessary to ensure officer safety for the purposes of issuing a traffic citation to defendant, but was requested to accommodate an arbitrary investigative sweep based on no suspicion of criminal activity whatsoever--Where nothing indicated that defendant's removal from the vehicle was necessary to ensure the safety of the officers to complete the traffic stop, the K-9 unit officer's command for defendant to exit the vehicle for officer's safety while he conducted vehicle sweep would need to have been justified by probable cause to believe that narcotics would be found in the vehicle--Forced removal of an individual from his vehicle before there is probable cause to believe that contraband is contained within the automobile, and without any evidence that such seizure is necessary to ensure officer safety during issuance of a traffic citation, constitutes an unreasonable seizure without any justification under the Fourth Amendment--Conflict certified.
DAVIS v. SHERIDAN HEALTHCARE, INC., 281 So.3d 1259, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2535a (Fla. 2DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case Nos. SC19-1923 and SC19-1936 (Laboratory Corporation of America v. Davis; Sheridan Radiology Services of Pinellas, Inc. v. Davis) (Consolidated). Order dated February 17, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Consumer law--Debt collection--Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act--Jurisdiction--Workers' Compensation Law does not preclude plaintiff's claims against her medical providers under section 559.77(1) alleging providers illegally attempted to collect money from her for service connected to workplace injury. Question certified: Does section 440.13(11)(c) of the Workers' Compensation Law preclude circuit court jurisdiction over claims under section 559.77(1) of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act?
DAVIS v. STATE, __ So.3d __, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1079c (Fla. 1DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-716 (Davis v. State). Order dated June 11, 2019. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Sentencing--A trial court does not violate defendant's due process rights by merely considering defendant's lack of remorse or refusal to accept responsibility--Lack of remorse or refusal to accept responsibility can be valid sentencing considerations when sentencing within statutory range--Court recedes from prior cases that suggest otherwise--Question certified: When, if ever, must an appellate court reverse a sentence based on the trial court's consideration of "remorse," "failure to take responsibility," or the like?DEFRANCES v. FURST, 267 So.3d 525, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D818a (Fla. 2DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-701 (Furst v. DeFrances). Order dated August 27, 2019. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Taxation--Ad valorem--Back taxes--Property that escaped taxation. Statute which requires property appraisers to assess back taxes, for up to three years, on property that should have been taxed but was not did not authorize assessment of back taxes against property that had been assessed and included on tax roll but that was mistakenly undervalued--Correction which did nothing more than increase valuation of property that had already been assessed is not basis for assessment of back taxes.
DENINO v. ABBATE, 247 So.3d 48, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1020a (Fla. 2DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-848 (Abbate v. Denino). Order dated December 27, 2018. No oral argument. Attorney's fees--Sanction for filing frivolous lawsuit--Trial court erred in denying motion for sanctions on basis that the motion was not served in compliance with the strict email service requirements set forth in Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516--Email service requirements of rule do not apply to a motion filed as part of section 57.105(4) safe harbor notice--Conflict certified.
DFG GROUP, LLC v. HERITAGE MANOR OF MEMORIAL PARK, INC., 237 So.3d 419, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D212a (Fla. 4DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-581 (Heritage Manor of Memorial Park, Inc. v. DFG Group, LLC). Order dated May 21, 2019. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Attorney's fees--Torts--Various claims arising out of sale of cemetery in which sellers discovered, after the sale, that an attorney at law firm retained by them received kickback from buyers--Trial court erred when it awarded as damages to sellers the attorney's fees sellers incurred during the sale where the sellers chose affirmation of the disputed contract over rescission of the contract--Sellers could not retain proceeds from the sale and also recover attorney's fees associated with the transaction--Punitive damages--Given reversal of transactional attorney's fees award, there was no compensatory damage award to support punitive damage award and, accordingly, punitive damages award must also be reversed.
DIAL v. CALUSA PALMS MASTER ASSOCIATION, INC., 308 So.3d 690, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2783a (Fla. 2DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-43 (Dial v. Calusa Palms Master Association, Inc.). Order dated April 26, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Torts--Premises liability--Slip and fall--Damages--Past medical expenses--Evidence--Trial court did not err by limiting plaintiff's evidence of past medical expenses to the Medicare bills that were indisputably tendered and paid--Question certified: Does the holding in Joerg v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 176 So. 3d 1247 (Fla. 2015), prohibiting the introduction of evidence of Medicare benefits in a personal injury case for purposes of a jury's consideration of future medical expenses also apply to past medical expenses?
DOE v. NATT, 299 So.3d 599, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1661a (Fla. 2DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1167 (Airbnb, Inc. v. Doe). Order dated March 2, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Arbitration--"Clickwrap" agreement--Arbitrable issues--Determination by judge/arbitrator--Action against Airbnb and individual from whom plaintiffs rented condominium unit, brought after plaintiffs discovered that there were hidden cameras throughout the unit which secretly recorded plaintiffs' entire stay, including private and intimate interactions--Neither arbitration clause in clickwrap agreement on defendant's website nor the American Arbitration Association rule referenced by the agreement provided clear and unmistakable evidence that only arbitrator could decide issue of arbitrability--Because parties' agreement was ambiguous on this issue, court retained its presumed authority to decide arbitrability--Conflict certified.
DORTCH v. STATE, 242 So.3d 431, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1545c (Fla. 4DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-681 (State v. Dortch). Order dated July 11, 2018. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Competency of defendant--Trial court erred in failing to hold competency hearing and failing to enter order on issue of defendant's competency prior to accepting plea--Appeals--Defendant is not required to file a motion to withdraw plea before raising issue of failure to comply with rules 3.210-.212 on direct appeal in cases where the trial court has reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent and has ordered an examination--Conflict certified.
ELLISON v. WILLOUGHBY, 326 So.3d 214, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D2221a (Fla. 2DCA 2021). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-1580 (Ellison v. Willoughby). Order dated January 25, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Torts--Automobile accident--Damages--Setoff--Collateral sources--Settlement agreements--Uninsured motorist insurance--No error in denying defendant's request to set off settlement proceeds plaintiff received from plaintiff's uninsured motorist insurer against jury verdict--Defendant preserved claim that she was entitled to setoff of settlement proceeds under section 768.041(2) where, although defendant never specifically cited the statute below, the issue was thoroughly litigated in the trial court, and both parties and trianl court relied on case law analyzing setoff of UM settlements under both sections 768.041(2) and 768.76(1)--Defendant is not entitled to a setoff in amount of settlement under section 768.041(2) where claims plaintiff asserted against his UM insurer were not asserted against defendant, and defendant was indisputably not a joint tortfeasor with UM insurer--Although settlement does not differentiate categories of damage to which the settlement funds are attributable, defendant is not entitled to recover the entire amount of the undifferentiated recovery as a setoff where plaintiff's claims against UM insurer could not be brought against defendant--Court rejects argument that denial of setoff results in a windfall to plaintiff--Setoff under section 768.76(1) is unavailable because the UM insurer settlement proceeds do not fall within the statutory definition of "collateral sources" set forth in section 768.76(2)(a)--Extracontractual damages paid to a first-party claimant on a UM bad faith claim do not meet definition of "collateral source" because it is not a payment of "benefits"--Fact that some portion of the proceeds fell within the definitional ambit of section 409.910(6) has no bearing on whether the proceeds meet the definitional criteria of section 768.76(2)(a), which provides a narrower, more specific definition of "benefits" and sources thereof than section 409.910(6)--Question certified: Is a settlement payment made by an uninsured motorist insurer to settle a first-party bad faith claim subject to setoff under section 768.041(2) or a collateral source within the meaning of section 768.76?
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v. FLORIGROWN, LLC, __ So.3d __, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1744a & 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2182b (Fla. 1DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-1464 (Florida Department of Health v. Florigrown, LLC). Order dated October 16, 2019. Oral argument set for April 22, 2020. Licensing--Medical marijuana treatment centers--Injunctions--Temporary--Question certified: Whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the statutory requirements of vertical integration and caps on the number of medical marijuana treatment center licenses as set forth in section 381.986(8), Florida Statutes, are in direct conflict with article X, Section 29, of the Florida Constitution?
FURST v. REBHOLZ, 302 So.3d 423, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1471a (Fla. 2DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1479 (Furst v. Rebholz). Order dated January 14, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Taxation--Ad valorem--Homestead exemption--Division of property--Commercial use--Trial court did not err in retroactively reinstating property owner's homestead exemption on 100% of his residence and awarding him a refund for taxes improperly paid after property appraiser retroactively divided 15% of the residence as commercial-use property upon discovering that property owner rented bedrooms in the home--The Florida Constitution and Florida law do not authorize such a division of a homeowner's permanent residence with respect to ad valorem taxation and the homestead exemption--To qualify for homestead tax exemption, a taxpayer must have legal or equitable title to property and maintain it as their permanent residence, and it is undisputed that property owner satisfied those requirements--No merit to argument that section 196.012(13) grants property appraiser the power to divide a permanent residence into a residential portion entitled to homestead exemption and a commercial-use portion which is not--Trial court erred in finding statute unconstitutional as applied because statute did not apply to issue presented.
GARCIA v. STATE, 279 So.3d 148, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2035b (Fla. 4DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-1870 (State v. Garcia). Order dated May 21, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Sentencing--Considerations--Uncharged crimes--Defendant's due process rights were violated where state urged the trial court to consider incidents of misconduct occurring after the charged offense, and defendant's sentence may have been based, at least in part, on that impermissible consideration--While trial court made no comment indicating that it considered defendant's subsequent misconduct in imposing sentence, the state failed to meet its burden to show that the trial court did not impermissibly rely on said misconduct where state's recommendation at sentencing hearing relied heavily on evidence of defendant's post-arrest misconduct, trial court specifically stated that the sentence was based on "all the evidence," and trial court imposed exact sentence requested by the state--Remanded for resentencing before a different judge.
GARCIA v. STATE, __ So.3d __, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2053a (Fla. 5DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1419 (State v. Garcia). Order dated December 8, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Search and seizure--Cell phones--Discovery--Passcode--Self-incrimination--Testimonial communication--Foregone conclusion exception--Compelled disclosure of defendant's passcode is testimonial and protected by the Fifth Amendment because order under review requires that defendant utilize the contents of his mind and disclose specific information regarding the passcode that will likely lead to incriminating information that the state will then use against defendant at trial--Foregone conclusion exception does not apply to compelled oral testimony--Conflict certified--Question certified: May a defendant be compelled to disclose orally the memorized passcode to his or her smartphone over the invocation of privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution?--Question certified: If orally providing the passcode to a passcode-protected smartphone is a "testimonial communication" protected under the Fifth Amendment, can the disclosure of the passcode nevertheless be compelled under the foregone conclusion exception or doctrine when there is no dispute that the defendant is the owner of the passcode-protected phone?
GARCIA v. STATE, 276 So.3d 860, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1152a (Fla. 3DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-1366 (State v. Garcia). Order dated January 12, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Second-degree murder--Second-degree grand theft--Circumstantial evidence--Where body of alleged murder victim was never found, state's circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish defendant's guilt of second-degree murder to exclusion of reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that victim's apparent death was not due to the specific criminal agency of defendant--Although evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant committed grand theft by two $500 ATM withdrawals from victim's account, evidence did not establish that defendant committed theft by depositing victim's checks in his bank account or receiving online transfers from victim's account--Because amount proved to be stolen from victim was only $1,000, second-degree grand theft conviction to be reduced to third-degree grand theft.
HOLT v. KEETLEY, 250 So.3d 206, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1389a (Fla. 2DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-1171 (Holt v. Keetley). Order dated December 20, 2018. No oral argument. Criminal law--Counsel--Appointed--Public defender's petition for writ of certiorari quashing circuit court's order appointing her office to represent indigent defendant in penalty-phase proceedings in capital case dismissed, as none of the arguments public defender raises were preserved, and because public defender failed to make threshold jurisdictional showing of material injury.
IVEY v. STATE, __ So.3d __, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D2004a & 43 Fla. L. Weekly D413d (Fla. 1DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-372 (State v. Ivey). Order dated July 11, 2018. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Jurors--Peremptory challenges--Racial discrimination--Question certified: Has a defendant who accepts a jury, but renewed a previously-raised objection to a state peremptory challenge after the challenged juror has been excused but before the jury is sworn, waived that objection?
JOHNSON v. STATE, 307 So.3d 853, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2154a & 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2758i (Fla. 1DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-20 (State v. Johnson). Order dated April 26, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Double jeopardy--Leaving scene of a crash involving death--Leaving scene of a crash involving injury--Separate convictions--Question certified: Given the requirements of section 316.062(1), does conviction on multiple counts under section 316.027(2), stemming from a single crash involving multiple victims, expose a defendant to multiple punishments for one offense in violation of double jeopardy protections of U.S. Constitution?
JOINER v. PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, 279 So.3d 860, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2397d (Fla. 2DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-1819 (Pinellas County, Florida v. Joiner). Order dated February 21, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Taxation--Ad valorem--Immunity--Counties--County's immunity from taxation does not extend extraterritorially to property that it owns in another county--Property owned by Pinellas County that is located within Pasco County is not immune from taxation--Question certified whether property owned by a county located outside its jurisdictional boundary is immune from ad valorem taxation by the county in which the property is located.
LAMBERT v. EMERSON, 304 So.3d 364, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D760a (Fla. 2DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1311 (Emerson v. Lambert). Order dated April 28, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Torts--Automobile accident--Vicarious liability--Dangerous instrumentalities doctrine--Family members--Bailee--Driver of vehicle involved in auto accident given permission to use vehicle by his mother who did not hold legal title to vehicle, but who was its primary user--Discussion of dangerous instrumentality liability--If a family member has an identifiable property interest in a vehicle, such as a bailment, and entrusts their vehicle to another who, in turn, causes injury, that family member can be held vicariously liable for the tort if the title owner denies vicarious liability for that entrustment--However, there is no sound basis in the law for holding both the acknowledged title owner and family member bailee liable for bailee's entrustment of the vehicle under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine--Trial court erred in denying mother's motion for directed verdict where father who was undisputed title owner of vehicle was also found vicariously liable for what was essentially the same entrustment of the same vehicle--Question certified: Under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, can one family member who is a bailee of a car be held vicariously liable when the car's acknowledged title owner is another family member who is also vicariously liable under the doctrine?
LASALLE BANK, N.A., v. GRIFFIN, 248 So.3d 191, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D953a (Fla. 1DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-1132 (Griffin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A.). Order dated December 19, 2018. No oral argument. Prohibition--Jurisdiction--Circuit court lacked jurisdiction to entertain third-party purchaser's motion for betterment damages filed after circuit court had entered final judgment of foreclosure in petitioner's favor and the time for filing petition for rehearing or motion for new trial had expired--Petitioner did not waive jurisdictional argument by participating in one mediation of pending motion for damages and waiting five years to raise jurisdictional argument--Trial court's reservation of jurisdiction in mortgage foreclosure suit does not change result, as trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider new claim that was not part of previous foreclosure litigation.
LEVY v. LEVY, __ So.3d __, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1680a (Fla. 3DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1195 (Levy v. Levy). Order dated February 3, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Dissolution of marriage--Attorney's fees--Settlement agreement--Enforcement--Trial court erred in denying former wife prevailing party attorneys' fees pursuant to parties' settlement agreement after she successfully defended against former husband's motion to compel her to reimburse certain overpayments and expenses and seeking credit against future spousal support obligations as consequence of money advanced to former wife--General magistrate's finding that parties' agreement only contemplated entitlement to attorney's fees and costs against "the party found to be in violation" of the agreement does not change result--Section 57.105(7), which makes prevailing party attorney fees provisions reciprocal, applies to successful defense of motion to compel.
M.A.B. v. STATE, 957 So.2d 1219 (Fla. 2DCA 2007). Supreme Court Case No. SC07-1381 (M.A.B. v. State). Order dated August 21, 2007. Oral argument set by separate order. Criminal law -- Juveniles -- Evidence -- Statements of juvenile -- Claim that postarrest statements should have been suppressed because Miranda warnings failed to inform juvenile of right to have attorney present during questioning -- Adjudications affirmed -- Question certified: Does the failure to provide express advice of the right to the presence of counsel during questioning vitiate Miranda warnings which advise of both (a) the right to talk to a lawyer “before questioning” and (b) the “right to use” the right to consult a lawyer “at any time” during questioning?
McKENZIE v. STATE, 272 So.3d 808, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1252a (Fla. 5DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-912 (State v. McKenzie). Order dated September 11, 2019. Oral argument set by separate order. Criminal law--Sexual predators--Designation--Jurisdiction--Trial court lacked jurisdiction to designate defendant a sexual predator after defendant had completed his sentence--Section 775.21(5)(c) did not grant authority to the trial court to belatedly designate defendant as a sexual predator where plain language of statute does not provide a recapture provision for offenders described in subsection (5)(a)2, the only subsection of paragraph (a) applicable to defendant--Conflict certified.
MENDEZ v. HAMPTON COURT NURSING CENTER, LLC., 140 So.3d 671, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D1191a (Fla. 3DCA 2014). Supreme Court Case No. SC14-1349 (Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Center, LLC.). Order dated December 16, 2014. Oral argument set by separate order. Torts--Nursing homes--Arbitration--Enforceability of arbitration clause--Non-signatory who is third-party beneficiary--Nursing home resident was bound by arbitration provision in nursing home admission agreement that was signed by his son after doctor at nursing home determined that resident lacked capacity to give informed consent or make medical decisions because resident was the intended third-party beneficiary of agreement.
MORGAN v. STATE, __ So.3d __, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D791a (Fla. 2DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-641 (Morgan v. State). Order dated June 29, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Sentencing--Correction--Appeals--Non-final-orders--Appeal of order vacating post conviction court's previous order which granted defendant's rule 3.800(a) motion seeking resentencing, and which was entered over a year prior--Court rejects argument that post conviction court was without jurisdiction to reconsider its previous order--Orders granting rule 3.800 motions are not appealable by the state prior to resentencing--Because state was unable to appeal the initial order granting defendant's rule 3.800(a) motion until actual resentencing had occurred, post conviction court retained jurisdiction over the case--The order granting defendant's motion was a nonfinal order, and courts may reconsider their interlocutory, nonfinal orders at any time they have jurisdiction and before final judgment or order has been rendered--Conflict certified.
MORRISON v. STATE, 161 So.3d 564, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D2255b (Fla. 2DCA 2014). Supreme Court Case No. SC15-1526 (Morrison v. State). Order dated August 20, 2015. Criminal law--Evidence--Hearsay--Exceptions--Excited utterance--Trial court erred by failing to conduct hearing or make required predicate findings before admitting 911 recording of domestic violence victim as excited utterance, but because defendant was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer and obstructing or opposing an officer with violence, and not of the domestic violence charge, the improperly admitted evidence was not relevant to the charges for which the defendant was convicted, and the error was harmless.
NOA v. FLORIDA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, 215 So.3d 141, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D682a (Fla. 3DCA 2017). Supreme Court Case No. SC17-738 (Noa v. Florida Insurance Guaranty Association). Order dated October 20, 2017. Oral argument set by separate order. Insurance--Homeowners--Appraisal--Ordinance and law--Where initial appraisal found that roof tiles damaged by hurricane comprised 3 percent of roof and stated that it did not appraise any allowance for the effects of law and ordinances, insured was not entitled to a second appraisal after a roofing contractor submitted a permit application to repair 30 percent of the roof which was rejected by building and zoning authority, as building code requires that not more than 25 percent of total roof can be repaired, and insured entered into contract with roofing contractor for a full roof--Notation on appraisal award that law and ordinance was not appraised indicated that appraisal panel concluded that building code requirements did not require replacement of entire roof, and that appraisal could not be circumvented by a later finding by a roofing contractor that 30 percent of the roof needed to be replaced, necessitating replacement of the entire roof.
OCHOA v. STATE, 120 So.3d 70, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D1672a (Fla. 2DCA 2013). Supreme Court Case No. SC13-1830 (Ochoa v. State). Order dated December 8, 2014. Criminal law--Double jeopardy--Separate convictions and sentences for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property were improper where offenses arose from single course of conduct--Possession of drugs--Challenge to facial constitutionality of applicable sections of Florida Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act is without merit.
O.I.C.L. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 169 So.3d 1244, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D1690a (Fla. 4DCA 2015). Supreme Court Case No. SC15-1570 (O.I.C.L. v. Department of Children and Families). Order dated October 30, 2015. Oral argument set for February 2, 2016. Dependent children--Abuse, abandonment, or neglect--Private petition for adjudication of dependency by undocumented immigrant shortly before his eighteenth birthday alleging abandonment and neglect by parents in foreign country, which adjudication would assist child in securing Special Immigration Juvenile Status visa that would enable him to apply for lawful permanent residency and secure a path to possible citizenship--Trial court did not err in denying petition based on finding that child did not qualify as dependent and was admittedly being well-cared-for by uncle who was ready, willing, and able relative and against whom no allegations of abandonment, abuse, or neglect were made--Discussion of factors trial court should consider when evaluating private dependency petitions filed on behalf of alien child--Although determination of child's status as dependent should be made independent of motivations for seeking that status, courts are cautioned to consider these sorts of petitions carefully.
O'NEAL v. STATE, 298 So.3d 77, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1449a (Fla. 4DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1023 (State v. O'Neal). Order dated February 8, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Murder with a firearm--Robbery with a firearm--Sentencing--Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time crimes were committed, resentenced to a mandatory minimum of forty years in prison under section 775.082(1)(b)1. for first degree murder with a firearm, and concurrent forty years in prison for robbery with a firearm--Trial court erred in resentencing defendant under section 775.082(1)(b)1. on murder conviction where jury never specifically found that defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill victim who was robbed by defendant and another individual immediately prior to shooting--Additionally, record does not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill victim--Reasonable doubt existed as to whether defendant or the other robber actually fired the gun given the contradictory identification given by witness to the crime--Error was not harmless--State could not rely on robbery conviction's special interrogatory verdict in which jury found that defendant discharged a firearm resulting in death or great bodily harm--Conviction on one count in an information may not be used to enhance punishment for a conviction on another count--Sentence for robbery conviction must also be reversed where nothing in record shows that trial court would have sentenced defendant to concurrent forty years but for its belief a forty-year mandatory minimum sentence was required on murder conviction.
ONEWEST BANK, FSB v. PALMERO, 283 So.3d 346, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1049a (Fla. 3DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-1920 (Onewest Bank FSB v. Palmero). Order dated May 20, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Mortgage foreclosure--Reverse mortgage--Defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor in action to foreclose on reverse mortgage on property where plaintiff failed to establish that the property at issue was not the principal residence of a surviving co-borrower, a condition precedent to its right to foreclose--Surviving spouse who resided at property was co-borrower under plain and unambiguous language of reverse mortgage, notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions in collateral documents identifying deceased spouse as the sole borrower--Doctrine of mutual construction does not, under facts of instant case, permit court to graft inconsistent provisions found in other documents onto reverse mortgage, which plainly and unambiguously treats both signing spouses as the "Borrower"--Reverse mortgage did not integrate non-borrower spouse ownership interest certification, which was not witnessed, notarized, or recorded in public record with the mortgage.
PACCHIANA v. STATE, 240 So.3d 803, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D367a (Fla. 4DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-655 (State v. Pacchiana). Order dated December 17, 2018. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Jurors--Challenges--Peremptory--Racial discrimination--Race-neutral explanation--Trial court erred in finding that juror's religious affiliation alone was genuine and race-neutral basis for challenge where state did not question juror regarding her religion before exercising the strike and, even after questioning, nothing in the record showed juror's religion would prevent her from being fair and impartial juror--Even if strike were genuinely based on juror's religion, member of a religion that is a cognizable class is protected from being struck from jury based solely on her faith where there is no evidence that faith would prevent her from being fair and impartial juror--Striking potential juror based entirely on particular religious affiliation, without any evidence that religion would prevent her from being fair and impartial, is impermissible "religious test" in violation of state and federal constitutions.
PATRONIS v. UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, 299 So.3d 1152, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1359d (Fla. 1DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1306 (United Insurance Company of America v. Patronis). Order dated April 5, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Insurance--Life insurance--Unclaimed property--Death Master File--Facial constitutional challenge to sections 717.107(1), (8), and (9) brought by insurance companies alleging that retroactive application of the three amendments was a denial of insurance companies' right to due process--Discussion of insurers' use of .DMF to search and contact deceased policy holders for payment of benefits, and statutory amendments at issue--Overall, the three amendments are consistent with the remedial purpose of Florida's unclaimed property laws and are in fact remedial in nature such that their retroactive application is generally permissible--Although trial court found that amendments were substantive, a "substantive" label does not necessarily preclude retroactive application if the statute itself expresses intent to apply retroactively and retroactive application is not unconstitutional--Legislature expressly intended amendments to apply retroactively--Amendments do not impair insurance companies' vested rights, as insurance companies have no vested rights in unclaimed property--Given the broad existing statutory duties of insurers, it cannot be concluded that the three amendments are a facially unconstitutional imposition of new obligations as to all insurers in all situations--There is no general impediment or burden on all insurers as to justify facially invalidating the amendments in toto.
PEATENLANE v. STATE, 240 So.3d 17, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D581a (Fla. 4DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-938 (Peatenlane v. State). Order dated January 27, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Sentencing--Probation revocation--Youthful offender--Trial court erred in not sentencing defendant as a youthful offender after repeated violation of community control and probation where he was originally placed on community control and probation as a youthful offender--Violent felony offender--Competent substantial evidence and abuse of discretion standards of review apply in determining whether trial court erred in designating defendant as a violent felony offender of special concern where the issue of whether defendant poses a danger to the community is an issue of fact and an issue of discretion--Based on circuit court's oral recitation of evidence, competent substantial evidence existed to support court's ultimate finding that defendant poses a danger to the community, and that circuit court did not abuse its discretion under statutory factors--Defendant's statutory maximum fifteen-year sentence for burglary of a dwelling remains legal irrespective of court's danger finding.
PENNA v. STATE, __ So.3d __, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D19c & D599b (Fla. 4DCA 2022). Supreme Court Case No. SC22-458 (State v. Penna). Order dated September 13, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Evidence--Statements of defendant--Statements made subsequent to invocation of Miranda rights--Question certified whether a defendant's Fifth Amendment Miranda rights are automatically violated when an officer fails to re-read a Miranda warning following a defendant's voluntary re-initiation of contact.
PERKINS v. SIMMONDS, 227 So.3d 646, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D2104b (Fla. 4DCA 2017). Supreme Court Case No. SC17-1963 (Simmonds v. Perkins). Order dated February 13, 2018. Oral argument set for May 8, 2018. Paternity--Standing to establish paternity--Child born into intact marriage--Trial court erred in finding that a putative father has no right to establish paternity of a child who was born into an intact marriage when the married mother and her husband object--Presumption that husband of biological mother of child is the child's legal father may be rebutted--Trial court erred in dismissing petition to establish paternity by biological father of child where child was given petitioner's last name, mother represented that she was getting or was divorced when she had child, petitioner financially supported child, and petitioner had a strong parent-child relationship with child.
PETRI POSITIVE PEST CONTROL, INC. v. CCM CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., 271 So.3d 1001, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1135c (Fla. 4DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-861 (CCM Condominium Association, Inc. v. Petri Positive Pest Control, Inc.). Order dated November 5, 2019. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Attorney's fees--Offer of judgment--Judgment greater than 25 percent of offer--Calculation--Prejudgment interest--Prejudgment interest may only be included up to the time of the offer--While court believes that plain meaning of "judgment obtained" as used in section 768.79 is inclusive of prejudgment interest to the date of judgment, the court concludes that Florida Supreme Court precedent has gone beyond statutory language to create a different threshold for attorney's fees under the statute--Question certified: For purposes of calculating whether a plaintiff has met the threshold amount of difference between an offer of judgment and the judgment entered for the purposes of section 768.79, Florida Statutes, must post-offer prejudgment interest be excluded from the amount of the "judgment obtained"?
PFEFFER v. LABOR READY SOUTHEAST, INC., __ So.3d __, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D1336b (Fla. 1DCA 2014). Supreme Court Case No. SC14-1325 (Pfeffer v. Labor Ready Southeast, Inc.). Order dated November 7, 2014. No oral argument. Workers' compensation--Attorney's fees--Statutory formula--Constitutionality.
POINT CONVERSIONS, LLC v. WPB HOTEL PARTNERS, LLC, 324 So.3d 947, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D1273a and 46 Fla. L. Weekly D1591c (Fla. 4DCA 2021). Supreme Court Case No. SC12-1071 (WPB Hotel Partners, LLC v. Point Conversions, LLC). Order dated December 7, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Patents--Licensing--Infringement--Jurisdiction--Subject matter --Action brought by plaintiff with exclusive license to third-party patents used to create software stating causes of action against defendant for unjust enrichment for benefiting from its patrons' use of software that violates plaintiff's exclusive license; temporary and/or permanent injunctive relief to enjoin defendant's violations of its exclusive rights; conversion by way of receiving illicit compensation for the unauthorized use of plaintiff's software; and violations of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act--Trial court erred in dismissing complaint based on determination that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff's claims necessarily required a determination of the scope, validity or infringement of a patent--Where it is clear that none of plaintiff's claims are created by federal law, those claims must meet all four factors set forth in Gunn v. Minton for federal court to have exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's proffered state law claims--All of plaintiff's claims necessarily raise an issue of federal law where trial court would be required to evaluate the validity and scope of the patents to some extent--Although defendant has not filed an answer or addressed merits of plaintiff's claims, for purposes of court's analysis, it is assumed that defendant actually disputes plaintiff's claims regarding the scope and validity of the subject patents--Issue of patent infringement, while necessarily raised, is not substantial enough to confer federal jurisdiction over state law claims where deciding a pure issue of federal law will not be dispositive to any of plaintiff's four causes of action; trial court's resolution will not control numerous other cases; and, because the resolution of the case will not control numerous other cases, the government has no direct interest in the dispute between the parties--Because issues of federal law within the four counts were not substantial, court also finds that bringing these claims in federal court would disrupt Congress's intended division of labor between state and federal courts--Conflict certified.
PREPARED INSURANCE COMPANY v. GAL, 209 So.3d 14, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D2322a (Fla. 4DCA 2016). Supreme Court Case No. SC16-2190 (Gal v. Prepared Insurance Company). Order dated April 26, 2017. No oral argument. Insurance--Homeowners--Property damage--Replacement cost policy--Trial court erred in finding as matter of law that replacement cost policy required insurer to replace damaged kitchen cabinets as matter of law--Under both governing statute and insurance policy at issue, insurer may limit its liability to reasonable and necessary cost to repair damaged, destroyed, or stolen covered property--Trial court erred in ruling that payment for general contractor's overhead and profit was required as matter of law where there remained disputed issues of fact as to whether a general contractor would be necessary to repair damage--Trial court abused its discretion when it struck all insurer's witnesses because they were not general contractors where there were disputed issues of fact as to whether damaged kitchen cabinets could be repaired and whether contractor was reasonably necessary--Trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting inquiry into a second leak that occurred after initial water damage to kitchen cabinets, notwithstanding claim by insured's expert that the second leak did not impact his opinion regarding amount of loss--Remand for new trial.
PUZIO v. STATE, 278 So.3d 82, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2033a (Fla. 4DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-1511 (Puzio v. State). Order dated June 25, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Sentencing--Offense committed by juvenile--Resentencing--Correction of sentence--Trial court erred in resentencing defendant for first-degree murder counts under section 775.082(1)(b)1. when jury did not find beyond reasonable doubt that defendant actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill victims--Lack of jury finding not harmless under circumstances--Remand for correction of sentences on these counts to reflect sentencing under section 775.082(1)(b)2., entitling defendant to review after 15 years in prison--Mandatory minimum--Forty-year mandatory minimum sentences reversed because section 775.082(1)(b)2. does not require 40-year mandatory minimums.
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY v. COATES, 308 So.3d 1068, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D126a (Fla. 5DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-175 (Coates v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company). Order dated July 8, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Wrongful death--Product liability--Tobacco--Punitive damages--Excessive award--Plaintiff awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $16 million in punitive damages--Question certified: When other factors support the amount of punitive damages awarded, but the award is excessive compared to the compensatory award, does the amount of punitive damages that may legally be imposed for causing the death of a human being depend on the actual amount of compensatory damages awarded to the decedent's estate, even when that compensatory award is modest and the punitive award would be sustainable compared to awards in other cases for comparable injuries caused by comparable misconduct?
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY v. PRENTICE, 290 So.3d 963, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2603b (Fla. 1DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-291 (Prentice v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company). Order dated August 11, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Wrongful death--Product liability--Tobacco--Engle-progeny case--Conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment--Jury instructions--New trial--Trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give requested special jury instruction on conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment which required the jury to find that decedent relied on a specific statement that concealed or omitted material information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature--Proposed instruction was correct statement of the law, supported by facts of the case, and necessary for the jury to resolve the issues properly--Failure to give requested instruction was prejudicial because jury might have reasonably been misled by instruction that was given--Because the record reflects that the issues of negligence, conspiracy, comparative fault, compensatory damages, and punitive damages are inextricably intertwined, a new trial is ordered on all issues.
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY v. SHEFFIELD, 266 So.3d 1230, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D408b (Fla. 5DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-601 (Sheffield v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company). Order dated August 13, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Wrongful death--Product liability--Tobacco--Engle-progeny case--Punitive damages--Trial court erred in applying version of punitive damages statute in place at the time Engle class was recertified rather than the version in place at the time of decedent's death where the statutory language of 768.73, as amended in 1999, unambiguously provides that it is to be applied to causes of action accruing after October 1, 1999, a cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the date of decedent's death, and decedent passed away in 2007--Manifestation of tobacco-related disease for purposes of establishing Engle class membership is a completely separate issue from the date a cause of action accrues--Conflict certified.
RESTORATION 1 OF PORT ST. LUCIE v. ARK ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 255 So.3d 344, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D2056a (Fla. 4DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-1624 (Restoration 1 of Port St. Lucie v. Ark Royal Insurance Company). Order dated December 27, 2018. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Insurance--Homeowners--Assignment--Clause in insurance contract requiring signatures of all insureds and mortgagees for an assignment of benefits was enforceable--Conflict certified.
RESTORATION 1 OF PORT ST. LUCIE v. ARK ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 255 So.3d 344, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D2056a (Fla. 4DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-1623 (Ark Royal Insurance Co. v. Restoration 1 of Port St. Lucie). Order dated December 27, 2018. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Insurance--Homeowners--Assignment--Clause in insurance contract requiring signatures of all insureds and mortgagees for an assignment of benefits was enforceable--Conflict certified.
RICHARDSON v. ARAMARK/SEDGWICK CMS, 134 So.3d 1133, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D388a (Fla. 1DCA 2014). Supreme Court Case No. SC14-738 (Richardson v. Aramark/Sedgwick CMS). Order dated November 7, 2014. No oral argument. Workers' compensation--Attorney's fees--Statutory fee schedule--Constitutionality.
ROBINSON v. STATE, __ So.3d __, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D180a (Fla. 2DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-408 (Robinson v. State). Order dated May 26, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Driving while license revoked--Habitual traffic offender--Notice--Jury instructions--No error in denying request for special jury instruction that would have included notice from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles as an element of offense--DHSMV's provision of a notice that a driver's license was revoked under section 322.251 is neither an element of nor an affirmative defense to the criminal offense set forth under section 322.34(5)--Court recedes from statements in prior holdings that mistakenly include notice as a required element of offense--To prove the crime of driving while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant drove a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state at the time defendant's license was revoked as a habitual traffic offender--Conflict certified.
RUIZ v. TENET HIALEAH HEALTHSYSTEM, INC., 224 So.3d 828, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1727a (Fla. 3DCA 2017). Supreme Court Case No. SC17-1562 (Ruiz v. Tenet Hialeah Healthsystem, Inc.). Order dated January 11, 2018. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Wrongful death--Medical malpractice--Trial court did not err in granting directed verdict for anesthesiologist who conducted pre-anesthesia evaluation of decedent who died of exsanguination during surgical procedure--There was no competent, substantial evidence that defendant's behavior fell below the standard of care, or that any breach of the standard of care more likely than not caused decedent's death.
SANCHEZ v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, 245 So.3d 933, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D891a (Fla. 3DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-793 (Sanchez v. Miami-Dade County). Order dated October 4, 2018. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Torts--Counties--Sovereign immunity--Trial court properly granted summary judgment, on basis of sovereign immunity, for defendant county in action alleging that plaintiff was shot while attending a birthday party in county park due to county's negligent failure to allocate off-duty police officers as security for partygoers--Sovereign immunity protects county's policy and planning decisions about where to allocate its limited police resources.
SANTIAGO v. RODRIGUEZ, __ So.3d __, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2562a (Fla. 2DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-1909 (Santiago v. Rodriguez). Order dated December 4, 2019. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Wrongful death--Medical malpractice--Noneconomic damages--Statute excluding medical malpractice cases from those in which adult surviving children have a statutory right to recover noneconomic damages for the wrongful death of a parent does not violate equal protection guarantees of Florida and United States constitutions--Trial court did not err in granting motion to dismiss on ground that action was barred by section 768.21(8)--Question certified: In light of the supreme court's decisions in Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014), and North Broward Hospital District v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2017), does Section 768.21(8), Florida Statutes, violate the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Florida constitutions, notwithstanding the court's prior decision on the issue in Mizrahi v. North Miami Medical Center, Ltd., 761 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000)?--Limitation of actions--Statute of repose not proper basis for dismissal where face of complaint did not conclusively show that action was time-barred.
SELLS v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., 170 So.3d 27, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D1044b (Fla. 1DCA 2015). Supreme Court Case No. SC15-1639 (Sells v. CSX Transportation, Inc.). Order dated February 19, 2016. Oral argument set by separate order. Wrongful death--Railroads--Action against railroad under Federal Employers Liability Act by personal representative of conductor on train who suffered cardiac arrest while train was in a rural area--Trial court did not err in setting aside jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and entering directed verdict in favor of defendant railroad--Defendant did not have duty to make automated external defibrillators available or to train its employees in CPR in anticipation of decedent's cardiac arrest--There was no showing that defendant's failure to procure prompt medical assistance contributed to decedent's death--Defendant did not have duty to require that its employees administer medical care in the form of life-saving techniques that require training or certification.
SHANDS TEACHING HOSPITAL AND CLINICS INC. v. ESTATE OF LAWSON, 175 So.3d 327, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D2000b (Fla. 1DCA 2015). Supreme Court Case No. SC15-1827 (Estate of Lawson v. Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics Inc.). Order dated June 17, 2016. No oral argument. Wrongful death--Hospitals--Medical malpractice--Presuit requirements--Applicability--Action alleging ordinary negligence against hospital arising out of death of psychiatric patient who apparently took employee's unattended keys and badge, escaped hospital, made her way onto nearby interstate highway and into the path of a truck, which struck and killed her--Because claims arose from services and care hospital was giving to patient who was confined within hospital's locked unit, which was the service that decedent's condition allegedly required, action was one for medical negligence and was subject to presuit requirements of chapter 766--Trial court departed from essential requirements of law by denying defendant's motion to dismiss--Allowing noncomplying medical negligence litigation to proceed frustrates purposes of Medical Malpractice Reform Act and imposes material and irreparable harm to medical defendants.
SOSNOWSKI v. STATE, 245 So.3d 885, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D789a (Fla. 1DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-1409 (Sosnowski v. State). Corrected order dated December 5, 2018. Criminal law--Battery on law enforcement officer--Resisting officer with violence--Lawful performance of legal duty--Officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for domestic violence at time of their encounter with him, and exigent circumstances justified their warrantless entry into defendant's backyard and home to ensure safety of five-year-old child whom officers knew was inside fortified home with defendant, a hostile and potentially violent aggressor--Trial court did not err by denying motion for judgment of acquittal.
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY v. LLORENTE, 156 So.3d 511, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D67a (Fla. 3DCA 2015). Supreme Court Case No. SC15-508 (Llorente v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company). Order dated August 18, 2015. Oral argument set by separate order. Insurance--Professional liability--Exclusions--Policy provision which excluded "claims arising out of the inability or failure to pay, collect, administer or safeguard funds held or to be held for others," unambiguously excluded coverage for insured's negligent disbursement of funds being held in her trust account while acting as escrow agent in real estate transaction.
SPEAR v. STATE, __ So.3d __, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D914a (Fla. 5DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-676 (Spear v. State). Order dated July 9, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Sentencing--Credit for time served----Jail/prison credit--Correction--Reduction of credit post-sentencing--No error in trial court's post-judgment, sua sponte correction of sentencing documents that overreported the amount of jail credit and prison credit awarded to defendant--Conflict certified--Rule 3.801 does not preclude the post-sentencing reduction in defendant's jail and prison credit--Rule applies only to situations where too little jail credit is awarded and does not apply to awards of prison credit--Trial court's reduction in credit did not violate constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy by impermissibly increasing defendant's sentence--A miscalculation in the amount of jail credit is a clerical error, which trial court has the inherent power to correct--Conflict certified--Question certified: Once judgment and sentence is final, does a trial court have the inherent authority at any time to sua sponte correct sentencing documents that overreport the amount of jail time served by defendant prior to sentencing or the amount of jail time and prison time served by defendant prior to resentencing?
STAHL v. HIALEAH HOSPITAL, 160 So.3d 519, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D718a (Fla. 1DCA 2015). Supreme Court Case No. SC15-725 (Stahl v. Hialeah Hospital). Order dated October 13, 2015. Oral argument set by separate order. Workers' compensation--Medical benefits--No merit to claimant's assertion that 1994 addition of $10 copay for medical visits after claimant attains maximum medical improvement and 2003 elimination of permanent partial disability benefits make Workers' Compensation Law an inadequate exclusive replacement remedy for a tort action--Copay furthers legitimate stated purpose of ensuring reasonable medical costs after injured worker has reached MMI, and PPD benefits were supplanted by impairment income benefits.
STATE v. CITY OF WESTON, 316 So.3d 398, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D813a (Fla. 1DCA 2021). Supreme Court Case Nos. SC21-917 and SC21-918 (City of Weston v. State). Order dated September 9, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Firearms--Regulations--State preemption--Violations by local governments and officials--Penalties--Immunity--Statutory penalties contained in sections 790.33 and 790.335, which can be imposed against governmental entities and individual officials that violate the legislature's total preemption of firearm and ammunition regulation, are valid and enforceable--Governmental function immunity does not shield entities that act contrary to or more restrictively than state law in the completely preempted field of firearm and ammunition regulation--Separation of powers doctrine does not defeat validly enacted general law, and does not enable state subdivisions or agencies or their officials to violate state preemption with impunity--Separation of powers doctrine protects only lawful and authorized planning-level activity, and the actions penalized in challenged statutes are, by definition, violations of statutes--Legislature is authorized to prescribe penalties for violations of state preemption, and the judicial branch must enforce them--Court rejects argument that local government officials have legislative immunity because such immunity was handed down to them when state legislature delegated part of its legislative authority to local governments--No immunity can exist for local or agency enactment of provisions in violation of state preemption and thus beyond the scope of state-delegated authority--Constitutional origins of local governing bodies do not confer legislative immunity on local legislators.
STATE v. D.A., 939 So.2d 149 (Fla. 5DCA 2006). Supreme Court Case No. SC06-2100 (State v. D.A.). Order dated February 12, 2008. No oral argument. Criminal law -- Juveniles -- Lewd and lascivious molestation -- Speedy trial -- Amendment of charging document during speedy trial recapture period -- Trial judge correctly applied binding precedent when it dismissed petition pursuant to juvenile speedy trial rule because state amended petition during recapture period to change erroneous citation to statute which applies to a defendant 18 years of age or older to citation to statute which applies to a defendant under age 18 -- Court is compelled by supreme court's decision in Glover v. State to conclude that age of defendant is element of crime of lewd or lascivious molestation -- Trial court correctly concluded that amended delinquency petition charged a new crime -- Conflict certified -- Questions certified: In light of the ruling in Glover v. State, 863 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2003), is the age of the offender an element of the offense of lewd or lascivious offenses under section 800.04, Florida Statutes? -- If so, does Williams v. State, 791 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2001), require dismissal of an amended delinquency petition, filed after expiration of the speedy trial period, which changed the age of the offender?
STATE v. PERRY, __ So.3d __, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D714c (Fla. 5DCA 2016). Supreme Court Case No. SC16-547 (Perry v. State). Order dated April 6, 2016. Oral argument set for June 7, 2016. Criminal law--First degree murder--U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hurst v. Florida, which held that certain aspects of Florida's capital sentencing scheme are unconstitutional, struck down Florida's procedure for imposing death penalty, not the death penalty itself--Trial courts erred in striking state's notices of intent to seek death penalty in two different cases on ground that Florida no longer had death penalty statute or statutory authority under which state could seek death penalty--Ex post facto laws--New capital sentencing legislation enacted in response to Hurst applies to pending prosecutions--Legislative acts effecting changes in criminal procedure, including procedural changes that disadvantage a defendant, generally do not violate ex post facto clause, and the new sentencing statute altered process used to determine whether death penalty will be imposed, but made no change to punishment attached to first-degree murder--Questions certified: 1) Did Hurst v. Florida declare Florida's death penalty unconstitutional? 2) If not, does chapter 2016-13, Laws of Florida, apply to pending prosecutions for capital offenses that occurred prior to its effective date?
STATE v. YEE, 177 So.3d 72, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D2332a (Fla. 3DCA 2015). Supreme Court Case No. SC15-1925 (Yee v. State). Order dated March 16, 2016. Oral argument set by separate order. Criminal law--Search and seizure--Residence--Warrantless search--Exigent circumstances--Trial court improperly granted defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence found in home he was renting where, given broken window that neighbors told officer had not been broken the night before and nonresponse to officer's call to anyone who might be inside, the possibility of an ongoing or recent burglary created an exigency making the warrantless entry into the home reasonable.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. MRI ASSOCIATES OF TAMPA, INC., 252 So.3d 773, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1149a (Fla. 2DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-1390 (MRI Associates of Tampa, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company). Order dated January 17, 2020. Oral argument set for April 1, 2020. Insurance--Personal injury protection--Limitation of reimbursement payments to schedule of maximum charges--Policy clearly and unambiguously elected to limit reimbursement payments to the schedule of maximum payments by stating that "in no event will we pay more than 80% of the No-Fault Act schedule of maximum charges' "--There is no merit to provider's contention that insurer must elect either the reasonable charge method of calculation or the schedule of maximum charges method of calculation and that because its policy includes both, insurer relies on an unlawful hybrid method of reimbursement calculation--Question certified: Does the 2013 PIP statute as amended permit an insurer to conduct a fact-dependent calculation of reasonable charges under section 627.736(5)(a) while allowing the insurer to limit its payment in accordance with the schedule of maximum charges under section 627.736(5)(a)(1)?
STATLER v. STATE, 310 So.3d 133, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D27d (Fla. 1DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-119 (Statler v. State). Order dated September 9, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Sexual battery--Section 794.011(5)(b) is not unconstitutional because it does not require the state to prove defendant's mens rea.
STEIGER v. STATE, 301 So.3d 485, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2013b (Fla. 1DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. 20-1404 (Steiger v. State). Order dated December 23, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Counsel--Ineffectiveness--Evidence--Autopsy photographs--Court declined consideration of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal where defendant did not preserve any of the errors advanced on appeal and failed to make any claim of fundamental error--Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting three autopsy photographs showing body's deteriorated condition where photos helped medical examiner explain the condition of the victim's body to the jury and how the body' s condition prevented medical examiner from determining the precise manner of death--Relevance of photographs was not outweighed by any prejudicial effect.
STOFFEL v. STATE, 247 So.3d 89, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1099f (Fla. 1DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-956 (Stoffel v. State). Order dated December 19, 2018. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Lewd or lascivious molestation of child under age twelve--Jury instructions--Trial court did not err by denying request for instruction on permissive lesser-included offense of battery where charging document did not allege that defendant's touching of stepdaughter's breasts was against stepdaughter's will.
SUAREZ TRUCKING FL CORP. v. SOUDERS, 311 So.3d 263, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2417c (Fla. 2DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-369 (Suarez Trucking FL Corp. v. Souders). Order dated June 30, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Torts--Contracts--Settlement agreement--Proposal for settlement--Acceptance--Essential terms--Payee--Defendant which attempted to reissue settlement payment to plaintiff individually as explicitly stated in proposal for settlement after previously issuing settlement payment to plaintiff, his attorney, and plaintiff's workers' compensation carrier who had filed a notice of lien against any settlement--No error in denying defendant's motion to enforce settlement agreement based on conclusion that there was no meeting of the minds on all material terms of the agreement--Payment of the settlement amount to plaintiff as the named payee was an essential term of the proposal where the statutorily-compliant proposal explicitly stated that plaintiff would dismiss claims with prejudice if defendant paid a specified amount to the plaintiff within 10 days of acceptance--By issuing a draft to third parties other than plaintiff, defendant materially altered the essential terms of the proposal--Inclusion of workers' compensation carrier as a payee not only changed term of proposal requiring payment be made to plaintiff, but also rewrote the proposal to include a requirement that plaintiff use a portion of the settlement to satisfy carrier's lien--Defendant's altering of plaintiff's proposal amounted to a counteroffer--Court rejects assertion that proposal only required a promise to perform because proposal required payment within 10 days from the date of acceptance, and that defendant accomplished this promise by filing a boilerplate notice of acceptance--Proposal did not only require a promise to perform as proposal makes clear that plaintiff would only dismiss his claims upon acceptance and payment--Furthermore, defendant's written notice of acceptance lacked specificity necessary to create a binding contract.
SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION v. WINCKLER, __ So.3d __, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2219a and 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2826a (Fla. 1DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-1998 (Suzuki Motor Corporation v. Winckler). Order dated December 19, 2019. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Civil procedure--Discovery--Depositions--Corporate officers--Appeals--Certiorari--Question certified: Does a trial court depart from the essential requirements of law by not requiring a party seeking to depose the top officer of a corporation to show that (1) other means of discovery have been exhausted and (2) the corporate officer is uniquely able to provide relevant information that cannot be obtained from other sources? Stated differently, does a departure from the essential requirement of law occur when the so-called apex doctrine, which applies to governmental entities, is not applied to a corporation?
TABRAUE v. DOCTORS HOSPITAL, INC., 272 So.3d 468, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D810b (Fla. 3DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-685 (Tabraue v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.). Order dated July 24, 2019. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Wrongful death--Medical malpractice--Hospitals--Defendant hospital owed no non-delegable duty to emergency room patient such that hospital would have liability for negligent acts of emergency room medical providers who are independent contractors of hospital--Court declines to expand hospital liability by concluding that non-delegable duty to provide non-negligent care to emergency room patients arises either by virtue of statutes or implied contract between hospital and emergency room patients--Conflict certified.
THACH v. STATE, 304 So.3d 387, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2215a (Fla. 1DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1656 (Thach v. State). Order dated April 26, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Sexual battery--Information--Amendment--No error in allowing state to amend information at trial--State's substantive amendment of four counts from sexual battery to lewd or lascivious molestation did not prejudice defendant's substantial rights where, although the two crimes are different, the information charged the crimes in a way that the elements of the lewd and lascivious molestation charges were subsumed in the prior sexual battery charges.
THOURTMAN v. JUNIOR, 275 So.3d 726, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1500c (Fla. 3DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-1182 (Thourtman v. Junior). Order dated January 3, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Pretrial detention--Article I, section 14 of Florida Constitution does not prohibit a trial court, upon finding of probable cause that defendant committed a crime punishable by capital punishment or life imprisonment, from detaining defendant beyond first appearance for a reasonable time pending a bond hearing without making a preliminary finding of "proof evident, presumption great"--Conflict certified.
TOMLINSON v. STATE, 322 So.3d 212, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D1527a (Fla. 3DCA 2021). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-1204 (Tomlinson v. State). Order dated February 7, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Extortion--Jury instructions--Trial court did not commit fundamental error by instructing jury that elements of extortion required legal malice rather than actual malice--Legal malice is more appropriate standard to be applied in extortion cases--Conduct extortion statute intends to criminalize, pertinent to instant case, is threatening an injury to reputation of another with intent to extort money or compel another to pay a sum of money against that person's will intentionally and without lawful justification--Conflict noted.
TRAPPMANN v. STATE, 325 So.3d 944, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D347a & D2160a (Fla. 1DCA 2021). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-1479 (Trappman v. State). Order dated January 12, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Aggravated battery of law enforcement officer--Battery of law enforcement officer--Double jeopardy--Charges stemming from incident in which defendant initially shoved officer and then ordered defendant's dog to attack that same officer--Dual convictions on both battery charges did not violate double jeopardy because there was sufficient evidence at trial from which the jury could have convicted defendant of both offenses based on distinct acts--If evidence supports convictions for two offenses based on distinct acts, it is not necessary to examine whether they would survive a same elements test under Blockburger--Conflict certified.
TSUJI v. FLEET, 326 So.3d 143, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D1766a (Fla. 1DCA 2021). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-1255 (Tsuji v. Fleet). Order dated January 13, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Torts--Estates--Automobile accident--Vicarious liability--Limitation of actions--Action filed within four years of accident, but more than two years after alleged tortfeasor died--Trial court did not err in determining that plaintiffs' vicarious liability claims against tortfeasor's employer were time-barred because plaintiffs' negligence claims against tortfeasor's estate were time-barred--Under plain language of section 733.710, the estate, personal representative, and beneficiaries of the estate are not liable for any claim or cause of action against tortfeasor decedent unless the creditor presents the claim within two years of the death of the decedent--Court rejects plaintiffs' argument that a plaintiff may bring a cause of action against tortfeasor's estate more than two years after tortfeasor's death when the plaintiff seeks to recover damages only from tortfeasor's casualty insurance--Although section 733.710 does not list casualty insurers among parties who are not liable for untimely claims against an estate, an insurer is not liable for such claims until a creditor seeks and perfects a claim against the decedent tortfeasor through the entry of judgment establishing decedent's liability--An employer cannot be vicariously liable if claims against its agent are time-barred--Conflict certified.
UNIFIRST CORPORATION v. JOEY'S NEW YORK PIZZA, LLC, 331 So.3d 1231, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D3b (Fla. 2DCA 2021). Supreme Court Case No. SC22-181 (Unifirst Corporation v. Joey's New York Pizza, LLC). Order dated July 27, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Arbitration--Appeals--Non-final orders--Appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review order vacating an arbitration award in appellant's favor and ordering the parties to renewed arbitration--Order is a nonfinal, nonappealable order--Court declines to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari because appellant cannot demonstrate irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal--Conflict certified.
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. CARMODY, 331 So.3d 236, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D2434b (Fla. 1DCA 2021). Supreme Court Case No. SC22-68 (University of Florida Board of Trustees v. Carmody). Order dated May 25, 2022. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Torts--Medical malpractice--Presuit requirements--Corroborating medical experts--Qualifications--Appeals--Certiorari--Petition seeking review of order denying motion to dismiss asserting that plaintiff failed to comply with presuit requirements because her corroborating medical expert was allegedly unqualified to address applicable standard of care--Petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction--Certiorari review is not available to review arguably erroneous rulings on qualifications of medical-expert affiants under chapter 766--Conflict certified.
VELAZCO v. STATE, 305 So.3d 72, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D394b (Fla. 3DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-506 (Velazco v. State). Order dated June 22, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Double jeopardy--Separate convictions and sentences for DUI causing serious bodily injury and DUI causing property damage arising out of same incident did not violate double jeopardy--Conflict certified.
WALTERS v. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 288 So.3d 1215, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2898a (Fla. 3DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-12. (Walters v. Agency for Health Care Administration). Order dated June 29, 2020. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Estates--Homestead property--Decedent's cooperative apartment cannot be considered homestead property for purpose of devise and descent--Question certified: Does the Florida Supreme Court's decision in In re Estate of Wartels v. Wartels, 357 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1978), have continuing vitality in light of the adoption by the Florida Legislature of the Cooperative Act, chapter 76-222, Laws of Florida?
WALTON v. STATE, 106 So.3d 522, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D333a (Fla. 1DCA 2013). Supreme Court Case No. SC13-1652 (Walton v. State). Order dated April 3, 2014. Oral argument set by separate order. Criminal law--Sentencing--Mandatory minimum--Consecutive sentences--Trial court may properly impose consecutive mandatory minimum sentences under 10-20-Life statute where defendant discharges a firearm during single episode involving multiple victims, and also where there are multiple victims in a single episode and defendant does not discharge a firearm--Trial court did not err in imposing consecutive mandatory minimum sentences on two counts of attempted armed robbery with possession of a firearm where the offenses were committed on two different victims in a single episode--Conflict certified--Trial court erred in resentencing defendant in his absence--Defense counsel's consent did not serve to waive defendant's right to be present at resentencing.
WARTHEN v. STATE, 265 So.3d 695, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D573a (Fla. 4DCA 2019). Supreme Court Case No. SC19-482 (Warthen v. State). Order dated December 10, 2020. Decision on oral argument postponed. Criminal law--Sentencing--Offenses committed by juvenile--Trial court properly denied rule 3.800 motion seeking resentencing on two consecutive sentences with combined term of 65 years for separate and unrelated homicide and non-homicide offenses--Conflict certified.
WEAVER v. MYERS, 170 So.3d 873, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D1676f (Fla. 1DCA 2015). Supreme Court Case No. SC15-1538 (Weaver v. Myers). Order dated April 13, 2016. Oral argument set by separate order. Wrongful death--Medical malpractice--Presuit requirements--Statutory amendments which allow for presuit ex parte interviews between potential defendants and potential claimants' treating health care providers, and require potential claimants to sign a written waiver of federal privacy protection concerning relevant medical information prior to instigating a medical malpractice lawsuit, are constitutional and are not preempted by Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act--Amendments do not violate separation of powers doctrine by intruding upon Florida Supreme Court's procedural rule-making power--Amendments do not constitute a special law--Amendments do not burden right of access to courts--Amendments do not violate right to privacy.
WEBER v. MARINO PARKING SYSTEMS, INC., 100 So.3d 729, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D2576a (Fla. 2DCA 2012). Supreme Court Case No. SC12-2507 (Weber v. Marino Parking Systems, Inc.). Order dated April 23, 2013. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Wrongful death--Negligence--Valet service--Action against valet parking service by estate of decedent who was killed in automobile accident while riding in vehicle being driven by vehicle owner to whom valet service had returned car keys while owner was obviously intoxicated--Trial court properly dismissed action on ground that valet parking service owes no duty to third parties to refrain from returning car keys to an obviously intoxicated customer--A valet service, a bailee, cannot be liable for negligently entrusting a car to its rightful owner.
WEEKS v. STATE, 146 So.3d 81, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D1798a (Fla. 1DCA 2014). Supreme Court Case No. SC14-1856 (State v. Weeks). Order dated December 15, 2014. No oral argument. Criminal law--Possession of firearm by convicted felon--Replica of antique firearm--Section 790.23, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional with respect to the possession of a replica of an antique firearm by a convicted felon--Statute is unconstitutionally vague as to antique replica firearms because the phrases "firearm" and "antique firearm" defined in chapter 790 do not give adequate notice of what constitutes a permissible replica of an antique firearm which may be lawfully carried by a convicted felon--Conflict certified.
WESTON INSURANCE COMPANY v. RIVERSIDE CLUB CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., __ So.3d __, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D590a (Fla. 2DCA 2021). Supreme Court Case No. SC21-567 (Weston Insurance Company v. Riverside Club Condominium Association, Inc.). Order dated November 12, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Insurance--Appraisal--Dispute over coverage and amount of loss--Discretion of trial court to determine the order in which the issues of damages and coverage are to be determined--Authority to compel appraisal on dual-track basis while preserving all of the insurer's rights to contest coverage as a matter of law--Conflict certified.
WHEATON v. WHEATON, 217 So.3d 125, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D411b (Fla. 3DCA 2017). Supreme Court Case No. SC17-716 (Wheaton v. Wheaton). Order dated October 24, 2017. No oral argument. Rules of Judicial Administration--Proposal for settlement--Service by e-mail--Attorney's fees--Trial court properly denied motion for attorney's fees pursuant to proposal for settlement because the service failed to comply with Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516, which sets forth requirements for service by e-mail--No merit to claim that proposals for settlement, which are prohibited from being filed with the court contemporaneously with service, fall outside the scope of rule 2.516--A proposal for settlement falls clearly within the scope of rule 2.516(b) and is subject to the rule's requirements.
WIGGINS v. STATE, 253 So.3d 1196, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1903a (Fla. 1DCA 2018). Supreme Court Case No. SC18-1766 (Wiggins v. State). Order dated February 1, 2019. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Firearm constitutes a "concealed weapon" as defined by section 790.001(3)(a)--However, possession of concealed weapon by convicted felon is nonexistent crime under section 790.23(1), which makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to "carry" a concealed weapon--Repeated mislabeling of offense as "possession of a concealed weapon by a convicted felon" and inclusion in the jury instructions of the definitions of "possess" and "actual possession" made it possible for jury to convict defendant of broader and nonexistent offense, thus making erroneous instructions fundamental error--Remand for new trial on crime of carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon.
WILLIAMS v. STATE, 167 So.3d 483, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D1337a (Fla. 5DCA 2015). Supreme Court Case No. SC15-1417 (Williams v. State). Order dated December 30, 2015. Oral argument set by separate order. Criminal law--Refusal to submit to breath alcohol test--Search and seizure--It is not unconstitutional to punish a person criminally for refusing to submit to a breath alcohol test when the officer conducting the test does not have a warrant--Although warrantless search of defendant in the form of a breath alcohol test following arrest for driving under the influence does not fall under exceptions to warrant requirement as a consent to search under statutory implied consent law or as a search incident to arrest, such a warrantless search satisfies general reasonableness requirement of Fourth Amendment.
WILLIAMS v. STATE, 189 So.3d 288, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D898d (Fla. 1DCA 2016). Supreme Court Case No. SC16-785 (Williams v. State). Order dated August 23, 2016. No oral argument. Criminal law--Sentencing--Correction--Trial court did not err in denying claim that sentence of life imprisonment as a dangerous sexual offender for a second-degree felony punishable by up to fifteen years' imprisonment was an illegal sentence--A minimum mandatory life sentence is authorized by section 794.0115 regardless of the statutory maximum of the crime--Conflict certified.
WILLIAMS v. STATE, 184 So.3d 1205, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D189a (Fla. 1DCA 2016). Supreme Court Case No. SC16-451 (Williams v. State). Order dated November 21, 2016. No oral argument. Criminal law--Search and seizure--Package sent via U.S. Postal Service--Search of package received by third party where the addressee was an alias used by third party, who had agreed to turn the package over to defendant after receipt--Evidence did not support finding that law enforcement impermissibly relied on third party's consent to search the package because law enforcement knew that third party was not the person to whom the package was addressed--Standing to challenge search--Expectation of privacy--Defendant had no standing to challenge search of package where defendant was not listed as the sender or addressee, package was not addressed to defendant under his fictitious name, and defendant had no expectation of privacy in the location where the package was delivered--Error to suppress marijuana discovered in search of package.
WILLIAMS v. STATE, __ So.3d __, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D363b (Fla. 5DCA 2017). Supreme Court Case No. SC17-506 (Williams v. State). Order dated April 4, 2017. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law -- Murder committed by juvenile -- Sentencing -- Sentence review after appellate court had reversed sentence of life imprisonment -- Where appellate court, on remand, had instructed trial court to make written finding as to whether defendant killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim, because the jury did not find that defendant actually possessed and discharged a firearm during the crime, trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to empanel a jury to make a factual finding as to whether defendant actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim -- Question certified: Does Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), require the jury and not the trial court to make the factual finding under section 775.082(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), as to whether a juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim?
WILSON v. STATE, 306 So.3d 1267, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2615a (Fla. 1DCA 2020) and WILSON v. STATE, 305 So.3d 839, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2620c (Fla. 1DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1870 (Wilson v. State). Order dated March 26, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Criminal law--Sentencing--Guidelines--Downward departure--Appeals--A defendant may not appeal an order denying a motion for a downward departure unless the trial court misapprehends its discretion to depart or refuses to exercise that discretion as a matter of policy--Conflict certified.
YBOR MEDICAL INJURY & ACCIDENT CLINIC, INC. v. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION, 310 So.3d 1060, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2554a (Fla. 2DCA 2020). Supreme Court Case No. SC20-1814 (Agency for Health Care Administration v. Ybor Medical Injury & Accident Clinic, Inc.). Order dated April 22, 2021. Oral argument to be set by separate order. Administrative law--Agency for Health Care Administration--Licensing--Clinics--Stay of administrative order pending appeal--Clinic's motion for stay is granted where agency order withdrawing clinic's license renewal application, while not suspending or revoking clinic's license per se, has the "effect" of suspending or revoking clinic's license as provided for in section 120.68(3)--If legislature had intended to limit availability of a stay to situations in which an agency order revokes or suspends a license, it could have easily employed more restrictive wording--Furthermore, agency has failed to demonstrate a stay of the order would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the state--Conflict certified.