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![]() October 6, 2025 - October 10, 2025
Civil Law Headnotes (Jump to Criminal Law Headnotes)
THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
Insurance -- Homeowners -- Coverage -- Directed verdict -- Trial court did not err by denying insured's motion for directed verdict and allowing the jury to determine whether insurer breached the contract -- Insurer's corporate representative did not testify that insurer breached policy or concede that payment was a breach of policy by stating that insurer paid actual cash value based on field adjuster's initial estimate which insurer's own expert testified “wasn't enough” and was “probably deficient” -- Although insureds presented expert testimony at trial that insurer's payment did not reflect the fully insured loss, the estimates presented during trial were prepared years after the loss occurred and lawsuit was filed, and were provided to the insurer only on the eve of trial -- Damages are assessed at the time of the breach rather than at the time of the trial
Insurance -- Homeowners -- Coverage -- Windstorm loss -- Judgment notwithstanding verdict -- Trial court erred by setting aside jury verdict which found that a hurricane created an opening in insureds' roof that allowed rainwater to enter their residence and that insurer failed to prove the damage was the result of wear and tear -- In concluding that neither the homeowners nor their expert specifically identified a specific peril-created opening and that the roof photographs showed no storm-related damage, trial court improperly reweighed conflicting testimony and substituted its own evaluation of the significance of photographic evidence for that of the jury -- Competing expert opinions and photographs provided competent substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that hurricane had created the opening allowing water intrusion -- Remand for reinstatement of jury verdict
Insurance -- Personal injury protection -- Denial of coverage -- Rescission of policy -- Material misrepresentation on policy application -- Garaging address -- Summary judgment -- Evidence -- Hearsay -- Examination under oath -- Trial court properly determined that sworn examination under oath in which insured admitted that he misrepresented his address on policy application was admissible summary judgment evidence -- Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of insurer based on EUO where no evidence was offered disputing insured's admission -- EUO was not inadmissible summary judgment evidence simply because it was made out of court and offered for the truth of the matter asserted where insured's admitted misrepresentation in EUO could be reduced to admissible form if insured were to testify directly at trial -- Admission of EUO did not violate section 92.33, which provides that “[e]very person who shall take a written statement by any injured person with respect to any accident or with respect to any injury to person or property shall, at the time of taking such statement, furnish to the person making such statement a true and complete copy thereof” and further explains that “such a written statement is inadmissible if a copy was not provided to the declarant at the time it was made or if a copy was not provided when requested” -- Insured's EUO was not merely a statement taken by the insurer, but a sworn statement made by insured, with counsel present, transcribed by a court reporter and notary public; and plaintiff has cited no authority holding that such an EUO qualifies as written statement under statute -- Even if statute applied, there were no allegations that insurer refused to furnish copy of statement to insured when requested
Mortgage foreclosure -- Quiet title -- Lien priority -- Junior liens -- Extinguishment -- Action seeking to foreclose larger of two mortgages following sale of property after foreclosure of second smaller mortgage which had also been held by plaintiff and had been mistakenly recorded first -- Trial court erred in finding that, because final judgment in smaller mortgage foreclosure action indicated that it foreclosed a first mortgage and that all other subordinate and inferior interests would forever be foreclosed, the larger mortgage was extinguished and title of buyer at prior foreclosure sale was protected under section 702.036 -- Trial court's unqualified description of final judgment in smaller mortgage action as foreclosing “a first mortgage and all other liens” is not supported by the text of the judgment where judgment stated that it only extinguished the rights and claims of the “defendants” in the action, and plaintiff was removed as a defendant in that action prior to final judgment -- Fact that case caption still listed plaintiff as a defendant is of no consequence -- Even presuming that smaller mortgage was in fact a “first mortgage lien,” the holder of a first mortgage lien cannot foreclose a junior lien held by a party that is not a defendant to the case -- Because final judgment in smaller mortgage action did not affect larger mortgage in any way, larger mortgage still encumbered property when buyer purchased property and section 702.036 did not apply
Torts -- Premises liability -- Trip and fall -- Public sidewalk -- Dangerous condition -- Action brought against Department of Transportation and the contractor who built portion of public sidewalk where plaintiff tripped -- Trial court did not err by entering summary judgment in favor of defendants based on conclusion that the less-than-one-inch vertical misalignment in public sidewalk was so open, obvious, and ordinary that it did not constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law -- Trial court properly rejected expert's opinion that building code applied to public sidewalk at issue where express scope of the code prohibits its application to the right-of-way sidewalk where plaintiff fell, and expert was unable to provide any support for his novel interpretation applying the building code to a public sidewalk unconnected to any building or structure Criminal Law Headnotes (Jump to Civil Law Headnotes)
THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
Criminal law -- Costs -- Court costs -- Statutory authority -- Trial court violated defendant's due process rights by imposing certain court costs for indeterminable reasons -- To satisfy due process, trial court must, at minimum, provide a specific explanation about what the cost assessment represents to allow a defendant to identify the basis for the costs imposed against him -- Trial court is not, however, required to provide statutory or ordinance citations for the costs, as no statutory or procedural authority requires this level of detail -- Conflict certified
Criminal law -- Self-defense -- Proper standard -- Evidence -- Post-traumatic stress disorder -- District court erred in concluding that expert testimony about defendant's PTSD is categorically irrelevant to a defendant's claim of self-defense -- Self-defense is not solely governed by reasonable person standard -- Because section 776.012(2) identifies both an objective reasonable person component and a subjective component to self-defense, state-of-mind evidence such as PTSD evidence can be relevant to the subjective component, even though it is irrelevant to the objective component -- Such evidence may tend to show that a defendant actually believed he was in imminent danger -- PTSD evidence may not be used to support an otherwise inadmissible claim of diminished capacity -- Where state-of-mind evidence is relevant to support a particular defense, the danger of a jury misapplying evidence as diminished capacity evidence may be prevented by giving the jury limiting instruction
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